Bezalel's Compass

September 30, 2009

Heidegger on Idolatry

Filed under: on idolatry — Eric G. Ivers @ 11:03 pm

“those in the crossing must in the end know what is mistaken by all urging for intelligibility: that every thinking of being, all philosophy, can never be confirmed by ‘facts,’ i.e., by beings. Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. Those who idolize ‘facts’ never notice that their idols only shine in a borrowed light. They are also meant not to notice this; for thereupon they would have to be at a loss and therefore useless. But idolizers and idols are used wherever gods are in flight and so announce their nearness.”

Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 307.


September 26, 2009


Filed under: Art — Eric G. Ivers @ 11:29 pm

Vorstellung is playing with the fine line that exists between the terms representation, imagination, idea and introduction (Schopenhauer’s book is translated either as The World as Will and Representation or The World as Will and Idea.) Indeed the word Vorstellung has an important but shifting philosophical pedigree in German idealism: for Kant, it is the basis of concepts and intuitions (Anschauungen); for Hegel, it is the preliminary form of the concept before it is specified and developed as idea, associated with feelings and hence its proper sphere of expression is art.

September 25, 2009

Heidegger and Rosenstock-Huessy

Filed under: On Existence and Time — Eric G. Ivers @ 6:12 pm

Heidegger thinks…the continuity of history, as it is experienced, is not constituted in accordance with the experience of time as a one-dimensional movement of ‘nows.’ The continuity of history is experienced within the context of discrete moments of life experience that achieves their unity of experience of past, present and the projection into the future in the ecstatical unity of temporality. (172) The original sense of temporality is historicity. (173) The concept of historicity, then, does not primarily signify human existence in history (i.e. real history)

In the case of Schelling and Bergson it was because they remained imprisoned by the mechanistic conception of sequential time in which past, present and future move in the one direction. Thus, in the opening chapter of volume 2 of the Soziologie, he takes issue with Schelling’s declaration in the Ages of the World that ‘the past is known, the present cognized, the future intimated’ (1958, 16–19).

Such a representation of space and time as one finds in the new sciences of the philosophies of Descartes, Newton, and Kant (for all their differences), certainly enables the sharpening of our understanding and observation of causal or material process. However, socially and personally we experience time as the push of the past and the future. Our present is not simply a passing point on a one-way flow, but the intersection of past and future in our present—future coming back to us as much as past coming toward us. Rosenstock-Huessy believed that this is how we experience the historical catastrophes which come from the conflict between suffocating spaces and the freedom to found a new time. Heidegger’s emphasis upon thrownness and projection make him much closer to Rosenstock-Huessy, but his substitution of historicity for real history, and hence real times, evident in the above discussion on names, remains a dividing line between them.

September 22, 2009

Hello world!

Filed under: Uncategorized — Eric G. Ivers @ 4:16 am

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